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Abstract
We study the e¤ect of uncertainty about the greenhouse gas emis-
sions arising from the production of biofuels on trade policy, in the
presence of lobby groups and two policy instruments, trade policy and
biofuels mandates. We show that in the presence of biofuels mandates
it would be optimal from a societal point of view to lower the trade
tari¤ on biofuels when the emissions from their production are shown
to be highas compared to when they are believed to be low. If the
government is susceptible to lobbying, the tari¤may be raised instead.
We further show that at subsequent time periods, the biofuels sectors
marginal lobbying e¤ort will not fall compared to previous periods,
and that consequently, its political contribution also does not fall. Fi-
nally we show how policy may be path dependent, i.e., that earlier
tari¤ rates in part determine future tari¤ rates if the government is
susceptible to lobbying and given that the domestic price of biofuels
does not fall. The model can, e.g., shed light on why the EU does not
lower the tari¤s on Brazilian ethanol in the face of new information.
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1 Introduction
A number of recent studies indicate that greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
from the production of biofuels can be considerable.1 One important moti-
vation for biofuels policy so far has been that these fuels, by replacing fossil
fuels, can lower the emissions of GHGs. The aim of this paper is to study how
new information about the GHG emissions from the production of biofuels
a¤ects biofuels trade policy in a large country, such as the European Union
(EU). We show, using as a starting point the model developed in Gross-
man and Helpman (1994, 1995), where Special Interest Groups (SIGs) a¤ect
the policy adjustment process, how lobbying by the SIGs can inhibit policy
adjustment and instead, make policy both persistentand path dependent.
The main policy instrument studied in this article is trade tari¤s. Stan-
dard normative analyses of trade tari¤s indicate that it is optimal for a large
country to impose an import tari¤because of the change in the terms of trade
that the tari¤ induces. Grossman and Helpman (1995), and the literature
following them adds to this by showing how SIG inuence also serves to give
the politicians incentives to implement a trade tari¤.
Biofuels mandates of some form are a fairly common policy instrument
in Europe.2 We include biofuels mandates into the model. These allow the
domestic price of biofuels to diverge from the price of fossil fuels. A biofuels
mandate is a quantitative policy instrument mandating the consumption of
1For instance, Searchinger et al. (2008) and Fargione et al. (2008) argue that the (in-
direct) land use changes that biofuels production leads to cause considerable, and so far
unaccounted for emissions of GHGs. Crutzen et al. (2008) show how emissions of other
greenhouse gases than carbon dioxide can increase with increased production of biofuels.
Melillo et al. (2009) calculate that emissions of greenhouse gases from the production and
consumption of biofuels can exceed the emissions that would take place if fossil fuels were
consumed instead (for the same result in Sweden, see Wibe (2010)). Furthermore, there
are indications that the production process, at least for some crops and in some countries,
can be so energy intensive that it uses up more energy than the nal product contains
(Soimakallio et al. (2009)).
2European countries that have implemented some form of biofuels mandate include
Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the
Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the United Kingdom (Energimyn-
digheten (2009)). Sweden has considered a biofuels mandate but as to date (December
2010) no denite decisions have been made. The United States has a blend mandate for
biofuels.
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a certain share of biofuels of the total fuel consumed. It can either be a blend
mandate (see de Gorter and Just (2009)) specifying how much biofuels must
be blended in a given quantity of fossil fuels, or a more general target for the
consumption of biofuels.
We construct a simple, three sector general equilibrium model. Con-
sumers maximize utility derived from the consumption of road transport.
Emissions create disutility. Road transport can be produced using either
fossil fuels or biofuels, where the consumption of the former is known to lead
to emissions, but where even the latter cause emissions from production. We
examine two cases of emissions: one where it is believed that the emissions
from the production of biofuels are lowand the substitution of biofuels for
fossil fuels leads to a net fall in emissions, and one where the net emissions
are positive instead.
Trade policy is decided at a central (e.g., the EU) level, taking both SIG
inuence and general welfare into account. We assume that the politicians
care about two things: political o¢ ce, and their career after they quit politics.
In order to stay in o¢ ce as long as possible the politicians must care about
general welfare, the level of which impacts on their (non-modeled) probability
of being re-elected. Considerations of their career past politics makes them
open for lobbying, however. We thus assume that the organized SIGs can
credibly commit to o¤ering the politicians lucrative positions after they quit
politics, and thus present a menuof contributionstied to the chosen trade
policy. The politicians consequently take both SIG prots and general welfare
into consideration when making policy decisions (for a similar argument, see
Cadot et al. (2006)). This modication of the interpretation allows us to use
an objective function à la Grossman and Helpman, but without the US style
campaign contributions, which are illegal in most EU countries. We call the
resources that the SIGs need to spend to lobby the policy makers political
contributions.
In the EU, the Member States determine domestically how to reach the
EUs goals for renewable energies. For this reason, besides considering trade
policy we also include local-level biofuels mandates in the model. However,
to keep things simple, we do not model the political economics behind the
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design of biofuels mandates but assume that these are set at the optimal level.
The model we set up can explain under which circumstances trade policy may
not only be persistentbut also path dependentin the sense that whether
there have been previous political decisions inuence consequent revisions of
policy. In particular, it may be that a revision of trade policy to take into
account new information about the emissions arising from biofuels production
is hampered by entrenched SIGs, when the government is susceptible to lobby
inuence.
In order to keep the model tractable, our study has certain limitations.
We do not make a di¤erence between di¤erent types of biofuels, except to
the extent that we assume that biofuels can either be produced abroad for
known lowemissions, or domestically for unknown emissions. This assump-
tion ignores the fact that biofuels production in every country faces the same
problems of indirect land use change. The reason for making the assump-
tion is the biofuels mandate; if there are no biofuels available that reduce
the emissions of GHGs, it would be optimal to have a prohibition against
biofuels instead of a mandate. We also do not consider the di¤erences be-
tween the gasoline and diesel markets. Finally, we ignore all additional policy
instruments; for instance, in many countries, biofuels mandates and tari¤s
are complemented with tax exemptions or rebates to biofuels. Adding more
policy instruments to this study would not add to the results, however.
The political economy literature studying SIG inucence on environmen-
tal policy-making is large, and not surveyed in the present paper. Those
studies most relevant to the present one are by Damania (2002), who explains
why greater pollution tax rebates are given to declining industries than to
growing ones, and Coate and Morris (1999), who study policy persistence
once policy has been implemented. Coate and Morris show how the fact that
policy tends to be persistent may hamper future attempts at policy making.
Our study di¤ers from these by explaining some circumstances under which
policy may not only become persistent, but also path dependent.
We will start by setting up the model. We describe consumer demand and
prices, the production of the two non-numeraire goods, policy instruments,
lobby groups, and nally, emissions. After having set up the basic model we
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solve for the tari¤ rate in the absence of a biofuels mandate. We continue
by solving the political game backwards, with both a biofuels mandate and
tari¤s. We shortly describe how the production of biofuels change due to the
policies, before solving for the politically optimal tari¤ rates, and examine
when policy may be persistent and/or path dependent. The nal section
concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Consumer demand, prices and production
Consider a large open economy. It is populated by N individuals residing in
m di¤erent local jurisdictions, so that mNm = N , with identical, additively
separable preferences. Each individual maximizes a utility function of the
form Uht = cOt + uR (cRt)    (Et). cOt denotes the consumption of the
numeraire good O, and cRt consumption of good R, road transport. The
sub-utility function uR (cRt) is di¤erentiable, increasing and strictly concave.
 (Et), where E is an expectations operator, and t emissions, is the dam-
age function, which is assumed to be di¤erentiable, increasing and strictly
convex. Individuals are assumed to be risk neutral with respect to the level
of emissions. The emissions will be discussed more closely in Section 2.3.
Subscripts denote sectors and time. We consider three time periods so that
t 2 f0; 1; 2g, where the timing of the beginning of period t+ 1 is unknown
at t, and depends on the availability of exogenous information.3
Good O has a domestic and world market price equal to one, and does
not generate any consumer surplus. The domestic price of good R equals
pRt. With these preferences, each consumer demands dR (pRt) units of good
R, where dR (pRt) is the inverse of the marginal utility function u0R (cRt). The
remainder of a consumers income, I, is devoted to the numeraire good. The
consumer then attains indirect utility given by v (pRt; I; t) = I + S (pRt) 
 (Et), where S (pRt) = uR [dR (pRt)]  pRtdR (pRt) is consumer surplus from
3By this we mean that at each period t = f0; 1g, the actors do not know when period
t+ 1 begins, and what the policies implemented at that later period will be.
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good R.
Road transport can be produced either using fossil fuels (F ) or biofuels
(B). Consequently, demand for it can be written as dR (pRt) = dF (pFt) +
dB (pBt).4 The price of road transport is a weighted average of the price of
fossil fuels and biofuels:
pRt = pBt + (1  ) pFt; (1)
where  = dB(pBt)
dR(pRt)
is the share of biofuels of total fuel demand. In the absence
of a biofuels mandate, pBt = pFt, in the presence of the mandate the two
prices (can) di¤er.
Good O is produced using labour only, with constant returns to scale and
an input-output coe¢ cient equal to one. We assume the aggregate labour
supply, l, to be large enough to ensure a positive output of this good. It is
then possible to normalize the wage rate to one. Biofuels are produced using
labour, land and fossil fuels. Fossil fuels are produced using labour and a
sector-specic xed input factor. Production is assumed to exhibit constant
returns to scale, the production functions are increasing and convex in the
factor inputs, and all the goods are produced under perfect competition.
Disregarding of the labour and capital inputs, the prot accruing to sector
j 2 fB; Fg is given by
j (pjt; pD; pF ) = pjtyj (pBt; pD; pFt)  pDDB (pBt; pD; pFt)
  pFtFB (pBt; pD; pFt)  Cj (t) ; (2)
where yj is sector js production function. DBt is the biofuels sectors demand
for land and FBt its demand for fossil fuels; pD and pFt are the respective
prices. Cj (t) is industry js political contribution.
We assume that the biofuels sectors factor demand does not a¤ect the
prices of land and fossil fuels,5 but that demand for land and fossil fuels
4We express demand in terms of energy content, which makes it possible to leave the
weights for the di¤erent energy contents of di¤erent types of fuels outside the model.
5Thus, even though the country we study is large enough for its policies to a¤ect the
world market prices, we assume its biofuels sector to be too small to a¤ect the prices of
6
changes in input prices, so that @DB
@pB
> 0, @DB
@pD
< 0, @FB
@pB
> 0 and @FB
@pF
< 0.6
Furthermore, land and fossil fuels can reasonably be either complements or
substitutes in the production of biofuels. Then, if land and fossil fuels are
substitutes (complements), @DB
@pF
> 0 (@DB
@pF
< 0) and @FB
@pD
> 0 (@FB
@pD
< 0).
2.2 Policy instruments and interest groups
Each level of government, local and central, has one policy instrument at its
disposal. The local governments in m jurisdictions impose biofuels mandatescm, which x the share of biofuels of the total fuel for road transport asb = mcm
m
. Hats on variables denote their values in the presence of a
biofuels mandate; variables without hats are the market equilibrium values.
The biofuels mandates, by forcing consumers to buy a certain amount of
(more expensive than fossil fuels) biofuels, allows the biofuels world market
price to rise above the price of fossil fuels, so that cpwBt > pwBt = pwFt. Since
demand for fossil fuels falls, their price falls so that cpwFt  pwFt. The total
e¤ect of the mandate on the price of road transport, cpRt, is ambiguous (see
Appendix 6). To simplify, we assume that interest groups do not a¤ect the
levels of the biofuels mandates directly.7
The central government imposes an import tari¤ on the imports of bio-
fuels and fossil fuels, both of which are assumed to be importables for sim-
plicity.8 The tari¤s are denoted by jt for sector j 2 fB; Fg. The tari¤s
determine the domestic prices of goods, which are given as pjt = (1 + jt) pwjt,
where pwjt is the world market price of good j. In order to simplify the analysis
its input factors.
6That pD is taken to be a constant means that even though changes in land use due to
increased production of biofuels can be considerable in an emissions perspective, they are
not large enough to impact on the equilibrium price of land. This could be the case, for
instance, if there was a su¢ cient supply of surplusor unused land. We study the case
where the biofuels sector a¤ects the cost of land in, e.g., Jussila Hammes (2009).
7In practice, of course, lobbies try to a¤ect the formulation and level of a biofuels
mandate as well. As we assume that the mandate is set at a di¤erent level of government
than the trade tari¤s, we argue that di¤erent lobby groups inuence the mandate-setting
game and ignore these.
8The analysis would not change even if the goods were exportables, as long as the
chosen policy instrument to promote exports was an export subsidy.
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we assume the tari¤ rate always to be non-negative.9
The government collects revenue from the tari¤s, and distributes these
in a lump-sum fashion to the consumers. The tari¤s generate the following
government revenue:
R (pt) =
P
j
jtp
w
j fNdj (pjt)  yj (pBt; pD; pFt)g :
The biofuels mandate, being a regulation, does not generate any government
revenue.
We assume that those owning the sector-specic capital, respectively land
used in the production of fossil- and biofuels have similar interests in the
trade taxation of their sector and form special interest groups to inuence
the governments trade policy. The formation of SIGs is not modelled here;
the reader is referred to Olson (1965), or for models of endogenous lobby
organization to Mitra (1999), Magee (2002), Le Breton and Salanie (2003)
or Bombardini (2008). We assume that at most two SIGs (j 2 fB; Fg)
overcome the free riding problem inherent to interest group organization and
form functionally specialized interest groups (see Aidt (1998)).10 The orga-
nized groups coordinate their political activities so as to maximize respective
lobby groups memberswelfare. The lobby representing industry j thus has
a political contribution schedule Cj (t) that maximizes
vjt = Wj (t)  Cj (t) ; (3)
where
Wj (t)  j (pjt; pD; pFt) (4)
gives the gross of contribution prots (welfare) of the members of lobby group
j, and the lobby group expects to give a contribution only once.
9With some reinterpretation even import subsidies and export taxes can be accommo-
dated within the framework of the model.
10That an interest group is functionally specialized means that it only cares about its
membersprots, not of other sources of income, such as transfers of government revenue.
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2.3 Emissions
Expected emissions of greenhouse gases are given by
Et (pt) = " [NdF (pFt) + EFB (pBt; pD; pFt)]+E
dDB (pBt; pD; pFt)+
w
t (p
w
t ) :
(5)
Emissions are a function of the consumption of fossil fuels for road trans-
port, and of the use of fossil fuels and land in the production of biofuels.
Parameter " measures emissions per unit use of fossil fuels, and parameter
d measures (domestic) emissions from land use for biofuels production. E is
an expectations operator. wt (p
w
t ), where p
w
t is the vector of prices, denotes
emissions from the rest of the world.
Uncertaintly about emissions from the energy required to produce biofuels
is reected in an expectation about the fossil fuel use in the production, EFBt.
Uncertainty about emissions from land use is reected by the term Ed. We
denote a case with low expected emissions with t(pt) and a case with high
expected emissions with t (pt). We assume that at time periods t 2 f0; 1g
the government expects lowemissions. At period t = 2 information comes
out indicating high emissions. World emissions, wt , are assumed to be
known to be low.
The (total) biofuels mandate has an ambiguous e¤ect on emissions (see
Appendix 6). In order for the mandates to be meaningful we assume that
their total net e¤ect is to lower emissions, so that
@
 bdt+cwt 
@b < 0. An increase
in the domestic price of biofuels has an ambiguous e¤ect on emissions (see
Appendix 6). Thus, an increase in the domestic biofuels price (and conse-
quently production) may either lead to a net fall in emissions, dd=dpB < 0,
or to a net increase in emissions, dd=dpB > 0. If the increase in domestic
emissions is high enough, it may actually raise global emissions, i.e., we may
have
@(dt+wt )
@pB
> 0. Finally, an increase in the price of fossil fuels, has an am-
biguous e¤ect on emissions in the absence of biofuels mandates, and lowers
emissions in the presence of mandates (see Appendix 6).
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3 Policy in the absence of a biofuels mandate
At time t = 0 there are no biofuels mandates. We assume that the tari¤
rates on biofuels and fossil fuels that prevail before the imposition of biofuels
mandates are set in a similar manner to the tari¤-setting game, which is
played after the imposition of biofuels mandates.
Thus, in a similar manner to Grossman and Helpman (1994), the govern-
ment chooses the vector of tari¤s to maximize
maxG (t) =
P
j
Cj (t) + aW (t) ; (6)
where Cj (t) is industry js political contribution, and a is the weight that
the government gives to general welfare relative to political contributions. If
a ! 1, the government only cares about general welfare, and if a ! 0, it
only cares about the SIG interests. Average (gross) welfare is given by
W (t) =
P
j
j (pjt; pD; pF ) + S (pRt) +R (pt)   (Et) : (7)
The derivation of the equilibrium in di¤erentiable strategies is done in
Grossman and Helpman (1994), Dixit (1996) and Fredriksson (1997), alter-
natively it can be modelled as a Nash-bargaining game as in Goldberg and
Maggi (1999), and is left out from the present paper. We note, however, that
(both locally and) globally truthful contribution functions satisfy
rCj (t) = rWj (t) ; (8)
i.e., that every SIG spends on lobbying activities up to the point where
their marginal expenditure exactly equals the marginal welfare change due
to trade policy. The equilibrium domestic prices supported by di¤erentiable
contribution functions and general welfare are characterized by the following
equation: P
j
rWj (t) + arW (t) = 0: (9)
In the absence of a biofuels mandate, biofuels are consumed up to the
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point where they are at most as expensive as fossil fuels. This determines
both the price of biofuels as pB0 = pF0, and the tari¤ rate as B0 = F0.
Maximizing the interest groupsobjective functions (3) with respect to
the tari¤ rate on fossil fuels yields @WF0
@pF0
= yF0 for the fossil fuels sector and
@WB0
@pF0
= yB0  XB0 for the biofuels sector. Substituting in these and the rst
order condition of the general welfare function (7) with respect to the tari¤
rate on fossil fuels into (9) yields
yF0 + (yB0   FB0)
+ a

 FB0  mR0@p
w
F
@pF
+ F0p
w
F0

@mB0
@pF
+
@mF0
@pF

  0 (E0) dE0
dpF

= 0:
mjt = [Ndjt   yjt] denotes imports of good j = fB; F; Rg. Imports fall with
a higher import tari¤: @mjt
@pF
< 0. The government believes that increasing
the consumption of biofuels unambiguously lowers emissions, i.e., dE0
dpF
< 0.
Simplifying yields the equilibrium tari¤ rate on fossil (and bio-) fuels in the
absence of a biofuels mandate:
F0 =
yF0 + yB0   (a+ 1)FB0 + a

mR0epwF ; pF +
0(0)0
pwF0
e; pF

a (mB0emB ; pF +mF0emF ; pF ) + (a+ 1)FB0   yB0   yF0
; (10)
where e; pF =  @Et@pF
pFt
Et
> 0 is the elasticity of expected low emissions to
the price of fossil fuels, and the other variables e are elasticities of the rst
variable in lower case to the second variable. The elasticities are all dened
so that they are positive, and they are assumed to be constants.
The tari¤ equation yields a modied Ramsay rule, i.e., the higher the
elasticities of import demand in the denominator, the lower the tari¤ rate.
This result is in line with Grossman and Helpman (1994) and the litera-
ture following that article. The rationale behind the nding hinges on the
deadweight loss that the tari¤ creates; the greater the elasticity of import
demand, the greater the deadweight loss from a given tari¤ rate. Lobbying
modies the rule, however. Firstly, since a higher (domestic) price of fossil
fuels increases the input cost to the biofuels sector, lobbying along with con-
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siderations of general welfare lower the tari¤ rate (the term (a+ 1)FBt, both
in the numerator and the denominator). Secondly, both the fossil fuels and
the biofuels sectors lobbying lowers (raises) the denominator (numerator)
as a higher tari¤ increases their output price and therefore prots. Thus,
the higher the domestic production (due to the adjusted tari¤ rate) of both
fuels, the lower (greater) the denominator (numerator) and the higher the
tari¤ rate. For lobbying not to lead to (from the viewpoint of the interest
groups) a perverse e¤ect, it must be that the denominator of (10) is positive,
however; otherwise lobbying would promote an import subsidy.
In the numerator of (10), the three rst terms arise from lobbying and
were explained above. The rst term in the square brackets reects the
change in the terms of trade due to the import tari¤, and serves to raise
the optimal tari¤ rate. Finally, considerations of emissions serve to raise the
tari¤ rate. In the absence of a biofuels mandate the tari¤ on fuels is the only
policy instrument available for internalizing the externality from emissions.
The tari¤rate in (10) determines the domestic production of both biofuels
and fossil fuels for time t = 0, i.e., before the local governments implement
biofuels mandates and the central government readjusts the tari¤ rate(s)
to take the mandates into account. We denote these production levels as
yB0 (pF0) for biofuels and by yF0 (pF0) for fossil fuels. The world production
of biofuels is given by ywB0 (p
w
F0).
4 Policy in the presence of a biofuels man-
date
In this section we solve a game at time period t = 1 (t = 2). In the rst
(unmodelled) stage in period t = 1, the local governments determine their
biofuels mandates.11 The interest groups for biofuels and fossil fuels take
the biofuels mandates for given and o¤er the central government their menus
of contributions Ci (t), which are contingent on the chosen trade policy.
11The result from solving for the biofuels mandates is uninteresting. It is available at
request from the author.
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The government, taking the political contributions and general welfare into
account, determines the vector of domestic prices. At this stage in period
t = 1 (t = 2), the government expects emissions from the production of
biofuels to be low(high). Once the vector of domestic prices is known, the
two fuel producing sectors adjust their factor demands and production. The
game is solved backwards.
4.1 Changes in factor demand and production
The introduction of the biofuels mandates, b = Pm cm
m
, x the share of bio-
fuels in the production of road transport. The total mandate is assumed to
be set at a level which increases demand for biofuels. The presence of the
mandate allows for the biofuels price to rise above that of the fossil fuels,
so that cpwBt > pwFt. We formulate the e¤ect of the mandate on the domestic
production of biofuels in the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 As long as the domestic price of biofuels does not fall after the
introduction of the biofuels mandates and the adjustment of trade policy,
domestic production of biofuels will not fall after the policy revisions.
Proof. The domestic production of biofuels is determined by their domestic
price. Thus, for production not to fall we must have
cpBt  pF0: (11)
Given that the total biofuels mandate is binding, the world market price of
biofuels must increase when the mandates are introduced, i.e., cpwBt > pwF0.
Then, for (11) to hold it is su¢ cient that
dpwBt
pwF0
> 1+F0
1+dBt , where the LHS is
greater than 1. Then, at all cBt  F0, and at some cBt < F0 where eitherdpwBt
pwF0
is large or cBt is not much lower than F0, (11) holds.
An import tari¤ leads to the replacement of foreign biofuels with domes-
tic, given the total biofuels mandate. This lowers the world market price of
biofuels, cpwBt, although not to the same level as during time t = 0, except
in the special case where the domestic production rises enough to cover the
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whole increase in demand for biofuels due to the mandate. The e¤ect reects
the change in a large countrys terms of trade.
As production changes, the biofuels sectors factor demand also changes.
If cpBt > pF0, the production of biofuels increases, and demand for both fossil
fuels and land in the production of biofuels increases. What happens to
emissions was discussed in Section 2.3. Finally, as is clear from Appendix 6,
the combined policies have an ambiguous e¤ect on the price of road transport,
and consequently, on demand for road transport (and the fuels).
4.2 Determination of the equilibrium tari¤
Maximizing the interest groupsobjective functions (3) with respect to the
tari¤ rate on biofuels in the presence of a biofuels mandate yields @
dWBt
@dpBt = cyBt
for the biofuels sector and @
dWFt
@dpBt = 0 for the fossil fuels sector. Substituting
in these and the rst order condition of the general welfare function (7) with
respect to the tari¤ rate on biofuels into (9) yields
cyBt + a  dmBt@pwB
@cpB + FtpwFt@dmFt@cpB   0 (Ebt) dEbtdcpB

= 0: (12)
Imports of both types of fuels fall with a higher price of biofuels: @dmBt
@cpB < 0
and @dmFt
@cpB < 0. Simplifying (12) yields the equilibrium tari¤ rate on biofuels
in the presence of a biofuels mandate:
cBt = cyBt + a
hdmBtepwB ; cpB   Ft pwFtpwBtdmFtedmF ; cpB  0(E bt)E btpwB eEb; cpBi
admBtedmB ; cpB   cyBt : (13)
The elasticities of expected emissions to pB are eb; pB =   d b1dcpB dpB1b1 > 0 at t = 1
with expected lowemissions, and eb; pB = d b2dcpB dpB2b2 > 0 at t = 2 with high
emissions. The  sign is positive for lowemissions and negative for high
ones.
Even here the tari¤equation yields a modied Ramsay rule (compare with
(10)), with the elasticity of biofuels import demand entering the denominator.
Biofuels sectors lobbying again serves to decrease the denominator. For
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lobbying not to lead to (from the viewpoint of the interest group) a perverse
e¤ect, the denominator has to be positive; otherwise lobbying promotes an
import subsidy. This condition sets a lower bound to the value that the
parameter a can take at
a >
cyBtdmBtedmB ; pB : (14)
In the numerator of (13), lobbying by the biofuels sector serves to raise
the tari¤ rate. In the square brackets, the rst term denotes the terms-of-
trade e¤ect of the biofuels tari¤, which gives an incentive to impose a tari¤
on biofuels regardless (see also (10)). The second term reects the e¤ect of
a biofuels tari¤ on the imports of fossil fuels; the more elastic the import
demand of fossil fuels to the price of biofuels, the lower should the tari¤ on
biofuels be. This e¤ect was missing from Equation (10). Finally, even in the
presence of a biofuels mandate, the emission term enters the tari¤ equation.
The biofuels mandate determines the share of biofuels in the production of
road transport as b. An import tari¤ changes the proportions of domestically
and foreign produced biofuels, making a greater domestic production possi-
ble and thus increasing the share of domestically produced biofuels in the
mix. This has consequences to emissions, which were delineated above. We
continue by examining the socially optimal tari¤ rates. The tari¤ equation
in social optimum (as a!1) simplies to
csoBt = dmBtepwB ; cpB   Ft p
w
Ft
pwB
dmFtedmF ; cpB  0(E bt)E btpwB eEb; cpBdmBtedmB ; cpB : (15)
Proposition 2 The socially optimal tari¤ rate will always be higher when
emissions are expected to be low (at t = 1) than when they are high (at
t = 2).
Proof. We prove Proposition 2 by contradiction. Therefore, we writedsoB2 >dsoB1, substitute and simplify to obtain
dmB2   dmB1 > 0
 b1 b1dmBeb; cpB + 0 b2 b2dmBeb; cpB
FpwFdmF edmF ; cpB :
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If dsoB2 > dsoB1 as assumed, the LHS is negative, since a higher tari¤ rate
lowers imports. The RHS is unambiguously positive. Then, LHS < RHS,
and consequentlydsoBt >dsoBt is impossible.
We continue by examining whether it is possible for the politically optimal
tari¤ rate with highemissions (at t = 2) to exceed the tari¤ rate at expected
lowemissions (at t = 1). We formulate the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 If the government is susceptible to lobbying, the tari¤ rate
on biofuels can be set at a higher level if the government assumes high
emissions than if it assumes lowemissions, i.e.,dB2 >dB1 is possible.
Proof. As the biofuels sectors contribution is determined by (8), its contri-
bution is a function of the chosen tari¤ level, cBt. We denote these by yB1
for lowemissions and by yB2 highemissions. We use the tari¤ equations
from (13) and examine whendB2 >dB1, taking into account that dmF2 = dmF1
since the share of fossil fuels in road transport is xed and imports are not
a¤ected by the level of emissions from biofuels. Using (14) to simplify the
denominator (writing a = IBdyBt+!dmBtedmB; pB ) yields
cyB2   cyB1 > a
24dmB1   dmB2 epwB ; cpB + 0
 b1cpwB b1eb; pB +
0
b2cpwB b2eb; pB
35 :
(16)dB2 > dB1 signies cyB2 > cyB1 since a higher tari¤ rate increases domestic
production. Furthermore, it indicates that dmB1 > dmB2 since a higher tari¤
lowers imports. Thus, both the LHS and the RHS of (16) are positive.dB2 >dB1 is then possible at a su¢ ciently low level of a:
a <
cyB2   cyB1dmB1   dmB2 epwB ; cpB + 0( b1)cpwB b1eb; pB + 0( b2)cpwB b2eb; pB
; (17)
i.e., if the government is susceptible to lobbying.
In the end, the two factors that determine the e¤ect of lobbying on the
tari¤rate are the governments susceptibility to lobbying, a, and the intensity
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of lobbying, cyBt, in respective time period. If the biofuels sector expects its
production to grow in the next period, it will invest more in lobbying than
if it expects its production to fall. Which is the case is, however, a function
of the tari¤ rate set. We now turn to the SIGs contribution decision.
4.3 Policy persistence
In this section we examine the persistence and path dependency of policy. To
this end we add one more feature to the model, namely that the adjustment
of production to the new tari¤ rate takes some time. Thus, at t = f1; 2g,
right after the adjustment of the tari¤ rate, the biofuels producers produce
approximately the same amount as during the last moments of period t  1,
and then adjust their production. In order to take this e¤ect into account we
adjust the rst derivative of the objective function (3) so that this becomes
(including a discount parameter ):
@CBt
@pF
=
@WBt
@pF
= (yBt 1   FBt 1) +  (yBt   FBt) ; (18)
@dCBt
@cpBt = @dWBt@cpBt = [yBt 1 + cyBt: (19)
where (18) applies in the absence of biofuels mandates and (19) in the pres-
ence of the mandates.12 This introduces a backwards looking term into the
objective function thus allowing past production to inuence lobbying, and
consequently future production. We start by stating the e¤ect that the bio-
fuels mandates have on the marginal lobbying e¤ort of the biofuels sector:
Proposition 4 Given that dpB1  pF0, the marginal lobbying e¤ort of the
biofuels sector in the presence of a biofuels mandate exceeds the e¤ort in the
12The second order conditions of the contribution functions are @
2CBt
@p2F
= @yBt 1@pF  
@FBt 1
@pF
+ 

@yBt
@pF
  @FBt@pF

> 0 in the absence of biofuels mandates, as long as the
own price e¤ect on production exceeds the e¤ect on factor (fossil fuel) demand, and
@2dCBt
@dpBt2 = @\yBt 1@dpBt +  @dyBt@dpBt > 0 in the presence of biofuels mandates. The contribution
functions are thus convex, i.e., a higher marginal contribution elicits a higher absolute
contribution.
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absence of a mandate. IfdpB1 < pF0, it is possible but not certain that this is
the case.
Proof. Starting with the former case (dpB1  pF0), we prove Proposition 4
by contradiction. From Lemma 1 we know that as long as dpB1  pF0, the
domestic production of biofuels at t = 1 is no smaller than the production in
t = 0: cyB1  yB0. Examining when @dCB1@dpB1  @CB0@pF0 , using Equations (18) and
(19) and rearranging yields
cyB1  1

(yB0 1   yB0) + yB0   1

FB0 1   FB0; (20)
where yB0  yB0 1 assuming that the price of biofuels at t = 0 is not lower
than the price at (the non-modelled period) t = (0  1). Di¤erentiating (20)
w.r.t. yB0 yields  1 + 1 < 0 since 1 > 0 as long as  < 1, i.e., (20) falls the
greater is yB0. The highest value that cyB1 can take for (20) to be satised is
thus when yB0 is at its lowest, i.e., when yB0 = yB0 1. Substituting into (20)
yields cyB1  yB0 1   1

FB0 1   FB0: (21)
But from Lemma 1 we have that when cpBt  pF0, cyB1  yB0 = yB0 1. Then,
given that FBt > 0 (t = f0  1; 0g), the LHS of (21) always exceeds the
RHS, and it must be that the marginal lobbying e¤ort in the presence of a
biofuels mandate exceeds the marginal e¤ort in the absence of a mandate.
IfdpB1 < pF0, however, cyB1 < yB0 = yB0 1. In this case, we cannot do the
last substitution, and while it is possible that the LHS of (20) still exceeds
the RHS for certain values of the parameters, it is easy to see that this no
longer is always the case.
For two time periods with biofuels mandates we formulate the following
Proposition:
Proposition 5 Given that cpBt  pF0, the biofuels sectors marginal political
contribution is at least as high at highemissions as it is at lowemissions,
when there are biofuels mandates in place at both time periods.
Proof. For two time periods with a mandate, t = f1; 2g, we examine
when the marginal contribution at a later period is lower than the marginal
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contribution at an earlier period. Substituting in from (19) simplies to
cyB2 < 1

(yB0   cyB1) + cyB1: (22)
Again, an increase in cyB1 leads to a fall on the RHS of (22). If cpBt  pF0,
from Lemma 1 cyBt  yB0. Substituting in cyB1 = yB0 yields cyB2 < cyB1 = yB0.
But because of Lemma 1, even in this case the lobbying e¤ort at t = 2 is at
least as high as during period t = 1.
These results can be compared to those in Damania (2002), who nds
that a contracting sector gives a larger contribution to a¤ect the level of
an emissions tax. While our results qualify those in Damanias model, as
a (biofuels) sector that contracts su¢ ciently in period t = 2 will give a
lower (marginal) contribution than it gives at t = 1, for a contraction that
is su¢ ciently small, and at su¢ ciently high discount rates, the contribution
of a contracting sector may well exceed that by a growing sector. While
Damanias result is due to a (fairly similar) lag structure combined with a
tax function which is falling and concave in contributions, here it is the lag
in contributions combined to the discount factor that leads to the result.
We end by examining when policy may be path dependent. With this
we mean that if information about highemissions were available already
at t = 1, then a tari¤ ratedB1 would be chosen then, and the tari¤ would
be adjusted at once both for the introduction of the biofuels mandates and
the highemissions. Otherwise, a tari¤dB1 is chosen at t = 1, the biofuels
sector adjusts its production, and rst at t = 2 is the trade policy adjusted
for highemissions. The question is then whether dB1 may exceed dB2 or
vice versa.
Proposition 6 Biofuels trade policy may be path dependent if the govern-
ment is susceptible to lobbying and given that cpBt  pF0.
Proof. We prove Proposition 6 by examining when isdB1 dB2. Instead
of the marginal welfare change, we insert the marginal contribution, @
dCBt
@dpBt
by the biofuels sector in the numerator of Equation (13). Using (14) and
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simplifying yields the following condition:
@dCB1
@dpB1   @dCB2@dpB2 < a
"dmB2   dmB1 epwB ; cpB +
 
0 (b1)cpwB b1   
0 (b2)cpwB b2
!
eb; pB
#
:
(23)
From Proposition 5 we know that @
dCB1
@dpB1   @dCB2@dpB2  0 given that cpBt  pF0.
Furthermore, from Lemma 1, cyB1  cyB2  0, which implies that dmB2 dmB1 
0 since higher domestic production lowers imports, and 
0( b1)cpwB b1  0( b2)cpwB b2  0
since emissions are determined by the level of domestic production of biofuels
and increase in greater production. Solving (23) for a yields
a 
dC 0B1  dC 0B2dmB2   dmB1 epwB ; cpB + 0( b1)cpwB b1   0( b2)cpwB b2 eb; pB : (24)
In other words, given that cpBt  pF0 and at a lowenough a we can havedB1 <dB2. Then the timing of the policy a¤ects the lobbying e¤ort of the
biofuels sector and consequently, policy becomes path dependent.
As was the case in Propositions 4 (and 5), it is possible that trade policy
may be persistent even if cpBt < pF0. It is, however, impossible to show at
the present level of generality at what parameter values it might hold in this
case.
The policy persistence model here can usefully be compared to that by
Coate and Morris (1999, p. 1327), who show that "policy persistence may
give rise to political failure, in the sense that the policy sequence emerging in
political equilibrium can be Pareto dominated. Political failure arises because
voters forgo support for policies which provide temporary e¢ ciency benets,
anticipating that they will persist once they have been implemented." Here,
we do not implicitly model the policy process of choosing whether to imple-
ment the biofuels mandates or not, but show that once the mandate is in
place, even if new information about emissions comes available, the direction
of change in trade taxation may well be to raise the tari¤, not to lower it in
order to take into account new information. The driving force is lobbying,
where the biofuels sector, like the sector gaining support in Coate and Mor-
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rismodel, has adjusted to the support policy, and continues to lobby for a
retained level of trade protection.
5 Conclusions
We have developed a model of trade policy determination for the biofuels
sector, where the production of biofuels may either raise or lower the emis-
sions of greenhouse gases. We examine trade policy both in the absence,
and in the presence of (local) biofuels mandates. Our main results pertain
to the situation with biofuels mandates in place, however. We show that it
would be optimal from a societal point of view to lower the tari¤ rate on
biofuels if information about highemissions becomes available. If the gov-
ernment is su¢ ciently susceptible to lobbying, it may be that the tari¤ rate
is raised instead of lowered when information about highemissions comes
out, however.
We further show that as long as the domestic price of biofuels does not
fall after the introduction of biofuels mandates, the marginal lobbying e¤ort
by that sector will not fall. Even if the domestic price falls, the marginal
lobbying e¤ort may increase (or remain constant). At the present level of
generality we cannot show this analytically, however. The result holds even
for two time periods with biofuels mandates, again given that the domestic
price of biofuels does not fall. Since the political contribution function is
convex in the own domestic price, a higher marginal contribution translates
to a higher contribution.
We are then able to show that the biofuels trade policy may be persistent,
i.e., a once imposed high tari¤rate will not be lowerd, given that the domestic
price of biofuels does not fall due to the introduction of biofuels mandates.
We end by showing that the policy may furthermore be path dependent in
the sense that if the policy was adjusted to highemissions earlier (at the
rst time period), the resulting tari¤ rate would be lower than the tari¤ rate
that will be determined when information about highemissions becomes
available rst later (at the second time period). The terms persisten and path
dependent are closely related, but we want to make the di¤erence between
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the two clear.
The present model contributes, within the connes of a specic model
and examining a specic sector, to our understanding of why once deter-
mined high tari¤s may be di¢ cult to change, even if new information comes
out. In period zero in our model, tari¤s were motivated by the fact that no
other policy instrument was available for internalising the negative external
e¤ect from greenhouse gas emissions. Implementing biofuels mandates and
adjusting trade policy to these may, however, under imperfect information,
lead to a sub-optimal situation if it is later shown that the production of bio-
fuels is indeed very energy intensive. By then it may be too late to change
earlier policies supporting the domestic production of biofuels. The model
also gives some insights to why, for instance, the EU does not lower the tar-
i¤ on biofuels despite the fact that from a climate point of view, Brazilian
ethanol, produced from sugar cane, would be much better than the domesti-
cally produced biofuels.
The model in this paper makes one particularly gross simplication,
namely the assumption that the world production of biofuels always leads
to lower emissions. Within the framework of the present model, however,
assuming that the foreign emissions, too, are uncertain would necessitate not
only the revision of domestic trade policy in face of new information but
would also require the revision of the biofuels mandates; or rather, it would
change the optimal biofuels policy from being a mandate to a prohibition of
the more-polluting-than-fossil-fuels biofuels. Even then, the balance of do-
mestically and foreign-produced biofuels would be determined by the tari¤
rate on biofuels after the mandate (or prohibition), however.
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6 Appendix
We di¤erentiate domestic emissions with respect to the (total) biofuels man-
date:
dbdt
db = "N
"
(1  b) @cdRt
@cpR
cpBt   cpFt + b@cpB
@b + (1  b) @cpF@b

  cdRt#
+
"
"E
@cXB
@cpB + Ed@cDB@cpB
#
@cpB
@b +
"
"E
@cXB
@cpF + Ed@cDB@cpF
#
@cpF
@b : (25)
The rst term in the square brackets on the rst line arises from the e¤ect
that the mandate has on the price of road transport. The term is negative
if the price of road transport, cpRt, does not fall when the mandate is intro-
duced: @dpRt
@b = cpBt   cpFt + b@cpB@b + (1  b) @cpF@b  0. If, however, the price
of fossil fuels falls su¢ ciently, cpRt may fall in the mandate and the term is
positive, thus creating a kind of Green Paradox(e.g., Ploeg and Withagen
(2010)). The second term in the square brackets on the rst line reects the
replacement of fossil fuels with biofuels due to an increase in the mandate,
and is unambiguously negative.
The two terms on the second line of (25) arise from the e¤ect that the
mandates have on the domestic price of biofuels and fossil fuels, respectively.
The mandates allow for the price of biofuels rising above that of fossil fuels.
This in turn raises demand for fossil fuels and land as input factors to biofuels
production. The term in the rst square brackets is thus positive. A fall in
the price of fossil fuels, due to the mandates, also raises the demand for fossil
fuels. However, the e¤ect of the fossil fuel price on land demand is ambiguous,
depending on whether land and fossil fuels are complements (@
dDB
@cpF > 0) or
substitutes (@
dDB
@cpF < 0). In the former case the last term is of ambiguous
sign, in the latter case it is positive. The net e¤ect depends on whether the
positive or the negative terms dominate (25).
We di¤erentiate domestic emissions with the domestic price of biofuels:
ddt
dpBt
= "N (1  b)b@dRt
@pRt
+ "E
@XBt
@pBt
+ Ed
@DBt
@pBt
; (26)
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where we have assumed that the price of biofuels does not directly a¤ect the
price of fossil fuels, i.e., that @pF
@pB
= 0. The rst term on the RHS arises
from the e¤ect that an increase in the price of biofuels has on demand for
road transport, which falls as the price of road transport increases. The
second and the last terms, which are positive, reect the increased demand
for production factors in the production of biofuels as the higher price of
biofuels induces more (domestic) production. The net e¤ect is determined
by whether the rst, or the second and third terms dominate (26).
Finally, we di¤erentiate domestic emissions with the domestic price of
fossil fuels:
ddt
dpF
= "

N (1  )2 @dRt
dpF
+ E
@XB
@pF
+ E
@XB
@pB
@pB
@pF

+ Ed

@DB
@pF
+
@DB
@pB
@pB
@pF

< 0; (27)
where @pB
@pF
 0, with strict equality applying in the presence of the biofuels
mandate. The rst and second terms in the rst square brackets are negative,
since demand both for road transport and for fossil fuels as an input factor to
biofuels fall as the price of fossil fuels increases. The third term is positive,
reecting the increase in biofuels output price in the absence of biofuels
mandates. The sign of the rst term in the latter square brackets is positive
if land and fossil fuels are substitutes in the production of biofuels, and
negative if they are complements. The second term is positive.
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